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Abstract
We examine the interrelation between interconnection and competition in
the Internet backbone market. Networks that are asymmetric in size choose
among dierent interconnection regimes and compete for end-users. We show
that a direct interconnection regime, peering, softens competition as com-
pared to indirect interconnection since asymmetries become less inuential
when networks peer. If interconnection fees are paid, the smaller network
pays the larger one. Suciently symmetric networks enter a Peering agree-
ment while others use an intermediary network for exchanging trac. This
is in line with considerations of a non-U.S. policy maker. In contrast, U.S.
policy makers prefer that relatively asymmetric networks peer.
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The rapid development of e-commerce industries and the emergence of Voice over
IP and Video-on-Demand services, which all rely on the Internet Protocol (IP)
standard, have increased the importance of the Internet as a global medium of data
exchange. Being a communications industry, the Internet is subject to network
externalities. These externalities have forced Internet Backbone Providers (IBPs)
to interconnect with each other in order to provide their customers with \world-
wide connectivity", hence increasing consumers' benets and willingness-to-pay for
Internet access. From an economic perspective there are several ways to interconnect
with other networks. The specic type of interconnection inuences competition for
end-users, and vice versa.
This paper aims to provide a general analysis of the industrial organization of an
unregulated Internet backbone market, i.e. the market for interconnection among
IP-networks, which also sell Internet access to end-users. We endogenize both the
networks' interconnection and their competition decisions whilst explicitly account-
ing for asymmetric network sizes, which are widely observed in practice. We study
the following questions: What determines networks' choices of interconnection? How
do dierent types of interconnection aect competition for end-users? Who pays
whom for interconnecting networks? Are networks' decisions in line with welfare
considerations?
We consider a new interconnection regime, Paid Peering, and nd that networks
that are suciently symmetric in size prefer it (together with the better known Bill-
and-Keep Peering regime) over using an intermediary network to exchange data.
For medium ranges of network asymmetry, Paid Peering dominates both alternative
interconnection regimes. By choosing Paid Peering networks can raise prots in
comparison to a situation where they are restricted to choosing between Bill-and-
Keep Peering and IP-Transit. Only for large asymmetries do they buy IP-Transit
from an intermediary network in equilibrium. Our model suggests that this inter-
connection behavior is not always desirable from a welfare point of view. Finally,
taking into account the fact that the market for IP-Transit is dominated by U.S.
carriers, a non-U.S. trade policy oriented regulator, who does not value prots of
the largest IBPs, nds that there is too much Peering and seeks to restrict Peering
of networks which are suciently asymmetric in size.
1Our model has the following timing: First, two networks, which are ex ante
connected via an intermediary backbone, negotiate their interconnection regime. In
case of Paid Peering, they also bargain for a settlement-fee (interconnection fee or
access price) that could ow in either direction. In stage two, they compete in
prices for consumers with heterogeneous preferences in a Hotelling model. Finally,
consumers choose the network that maximizes their net benets.
Our results show that the initial level of asymmetry in network sizes aects
equilibrium outcomes: the larger the ex ante asymmetry is, the larger the prot
dierences between the networks when using an intermediary backbone, which in
turn serve as threat points in the Nash bargaining game. As a consequence, both the
settlement-fee resulting from the bargaining process and the interconnection decision
reached in equilibrium depend on the degree of network asymmetry.
We obtain these results without assuming direct network externalities in the
utility function of consumers. If Internet-users valued direct connection to a large
network over a small network, our results would be even more pronounced.
There is a large body of literature on interconnection and two-way access pricing
in telecommunications, which one might think of as being related to the Internet
backbone market. Armstrong (1998) and Laont et al. (1998) constitute two fun-
damental works, while Vogelsang (2003) provides a comprehensive survey of this
literature. However, there are two crucial dierences that make an adoption of the
analysis on the telecommunications market to the Internet backbone highly prob-
lematic: First, interconnection in the Internet backbone is not subject to regulation.
Cash ows associated with interconnection on the Internet do not depend on the
direction of trac but may be negotiated freely in the market.1 Second, destina-
tion based price discrimination is usual in telecommunications, while it is practically
impossible on the Internet.2
There is also a more recent theoretical literature on telecommunications relaxing
these industry specic restrictions: Carter and Wright (2003), Armstrong (2004),
1In the telecommunications industry there exist various regulatory schemes around the globe,
which rule network interconnection. Moreover, policy makers often require termination charges or
\access charges" to be set reciprocally.
2It is standard for consumers to pay more for long-distance or international phone calls than for
local calls. To imitate such price discrimination on the Internet, a consumer would have to be asked
before each click on a Web link whether she would be willing to pay a specic price depending on
the network distance to a specic target Web site's location.
2Gilo and Spiegel (2004) and Peitz (2005) study competitively chosen asymmetric
access prices, asymmetric networks or IP-Transit as an outside option when negoti-
ating the terms of interconnection. Our paper is the rst to unify all three issues in
one model.
Focusing on the Internet, Laont et al. (2003) study the strategic behavior of
backbone operators in an environment of reciprocal access pricing in two-sided mar-
kets. Mendelson and Shneorson (2003) extend this framework to consumer delay
costs and capacity decisions. Contrarily, because of already existing world-wide
connectivity we abstract from network externalities in consumers' utility functions.
Because of the unregulated nature of the Internet backbone, we let networks nego-
tiate access prices freely.
Using a model of price competition, Giovannetti (2002) shows that the introduc-
tion of competition for Transit services may lead to ercer competition in original
areas of the Internet and thereby lower access and retail prices. Cr emer et al. (2000)
analyze in a Cournot model (thus endogenizing capacity) whether dominant network
operators have incentives to lower the interconnection quality to rival networks. By
extending the Katz and Shapiro (1985) network competition model they show that a
network with a large installed base of customers is likely to degrade its interconnec-
tion quality with smaller networks.3 However, nowadays there is excess capacity all
over the backbone market,4 and the marginal costs of data transmission are virtually
zero.5 Instead of modelling competition based on capacities we take excess capacity
as given and focus on price competition with dierentiated products in the retail
market against the background of (exogenous) competition in the Transit market.
Instead of competition based on quality of interconnection we assume perfect trans-
mission quality, which is due to the existing world-wide connectivity and the absence
3Foros and Hansen (2001) also study interconnection quality and competition between IBPs
but derive opposing results concerning the development of market shares. Roson (2002) provides
a more thorough discussion of Cr emer et al. (2000) and that article. Foros et al. (2005) analyze
interconnection in a two-stage game where networks rst decide about interconnection quality and
compete in quantities thereafter.
4Telegeography, a consultancy, notes: "Despite signicant and consistent growth in data trac
ows across the world's communications networks, a huge portion of potential network capacity re-
mains unused. [...] only three percent of the maximum possible intercity bandwidth in Europe and
the U.S. has been 'lit' for service provision."(http://www.telegeography.com/press/releases/2005-
04-20.php)
5See Atkinson and Barnekov (2004) or Nuechterlein and Weiser (2005, p.38).
3or bottlenecks, and let networks choose amongst several interconnection regimes.6
The papers connected closest to our's are Baake and Wichmann (1999) and
Besen et al. (2001) in the sense that they also endogenize the choice of IBPs' in-
terconnection regime. The former studies the Transit vs. Peering decision in the
context of quality dierentials, while the latter provides a bargaining process of Peer-
ing partners (implicitly introducing the option for Paid Peering). Neither considers
the eects on competition for end-users. To the best of our knowledge, our paper
is the rst to attempt to endogenize both networks' interconnection and competi-
tion decisions among asymmetric networks whilst taking into account the economic
dierences between the Internet backbone and telecommunications markets.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the most widely used
interconnection regimes in more detail. Section 3 introduces the model. Section 4
analyzes networks' equilibrium prices, market shares and prots in the retail market
while distinguishing Intermediary and Bill-and-Keep Peering regimes. Section 5
examines the incentives to peer and nds interconnection equilibria. Section 6 takes
a welfare perspective. Section 7 discusses the robustness of our results to relaxing
some of the central assumptions of this model, while section 8 concludes.
2 Interconnection Practice in the Internet Back-
bone Market
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) mentions
in its Information Economy Report 2005 (p.93) that over 300 operators were pro-
viding commercial backbone services at the end of 2004. According to the report,
the \broader network services industry sales are estimated at about $1.3 trillion
worldwide. [...] Of the 300 backbone networks mentioned before, the top 50 carry
nearly 95 per cent of all IP trac, and only ve of them can be considered to have
a truly global presence."These numbers suggest that IP-networks are heterogenous
in terms of size, i.e. in terms of trac volume or subscribers, which could have an
impact on interconnection practice.
How does trac get from consumer 1 to consumer 2? Suppose 1 and 2 are
6In the Internet backbone, excess capacity leads to virtually perfect quality of interconnection.
4communicating via the Internet and consumer 1 (2) is connected to network A (B).
The networks have two main options to exchange trac, Transit and Peering.
IP-Transit/Intermediary: If a direct connection is not feasible or desirable,
two networks can buy so-called Transit services from a third network. Under such
an arrangement each network pays a variable charge per unit of trac to the inter-
mediary network which commits to deliver the trac to any specied destination
and from a given origination. For being able to full this obligation, networks oer-
ing Transit mostly have a large physical network and are connected to many other
networks via Peering or further Transit sales. The IP-Transit market is dominated
by so-called Tier-1 networks which are mainly U.S. based.7
Peering:8 Bill-and-Keep Peering, also called settlement-free Peering, has evolved
as the regular type of direct interconnection regime between two networks since pri-
vatization of the Internet. Networks exchange trac without charging any fees to
each other. However, under such a Peering agreement no participating network has
the obligation to terminate trac to or from a third party. Each network must only
process trac from the Peering partner to its own customers (and the customers of
their customers and so on), but not to the remainder of the Internet. This constitutes
a major dierence between IP-Transit and Peering. In our example, consumers 1
and 2 can exchange trac without causing any interconnection costs to the networks
they have subscribed to if those networks are peering.
A Paid Peering regime between two networks implies the same rights concerning
their exchange of trac. In contrast to Bill-and-Keep, one network charges the
other for exchanging trac. We may emphasize that Paid Peering is a relatively
new type of interconnection regime and has only recently begun to be employed.9 In
our example, suppose network A agreed to pay for trac exchange with network B,
thereby forming a Paid Peering interconnection regime. In this environment it has
no impact on the stream of money whether 1 sends an e-mail to 2, or vice versa: in
7A network is regarded to have Tier-1 status if it is connected to the whole Internet while never
paying for interconnection itself.
8In the industry, there is a dierence between \Private Peering", where exactly two networks
build or lease lines to interconnect, and\Public Peering"where several networks interconnect their
lines in a node, a so-called Internet Exchange Point. As economic dierences are not very signicant
and more and more networks use Private Peering, we only consider this type in our model. See
Kende (2000) for more details.
9A Paid Peering settlement could appear in several dierent forms of payment, either xed
amount payments or a variable charge per unit of trac (or a combination of both).
5both cases network A will pay B. However, since Paid Peering is no Transit contract,
network B will not proceed trac from A to a third party that is not a customer of
B.10
3 The Model
There are two networks i 2 fA;Bg each having a xed installed base of i customers
that is not subject to competition.11 Without loss of generality we assume A  B.
On top,   consumers are situated in a battlezone, where networks A and B compete
in prices.12 We assume excess capacity on the part of the networks so they can
serve battlezone consumers without extra investments. Ex ante both networks are
connected to the remainder of the Internet by using an Intermediary, thereby oering
their customers world-wide connectivity.13 As there is Bertrand price competition
in the market for IP-Transit, we assume the Intermediary to be the cheapest Tier-1
network available, by denition oering access to all remaining consumers connected
to the Internet, .14 It is not relevant whether the Intermediary directly serves
the  consumers as ISP or connects other networks' consumers via its backbone to
networks A and B. There is a continuum of consumers, of mass 1, so A+B+ + =
1: Figure 1 shows the competition set-up.
Networks' cost structure:
 Networks face an exogenous market price for upstream Transit, t, per unit of
10For more details on Internet trac, see Giovanetti and Ristuccia (2005) or Kende (2000).
11Internet Service Providers selling Internet access to those consumers are vertically integrated.
12The most intuitive explanation is geographic: the locked customers of network i can only be
directly connected to network j for prohibitively high costs, e.g. because they live in a rural area.
The battlezone, however, consists of consumers living in large cities where both networks have a
point of presence (POP). Another interpretation is that A and B compete in new services, e.g.
Voice over IP, in the battlezone but also have legacy customers who are not interested in such
services.
13In line with this, we model no quality dierentials among Peering and Transit, unlike Cr emer
et al. (2000) or Baake and Wichmann (1998), since, according to industry representatives, there
is no clear relationship between interconnection quality and regimes. Consequently, demand-side
network eects do not play a role in the model since customers enjoy world-wide connectivity on
a constant quality level regardless of the networks' interconnection decision or competition.
14In our model we do not cover competition where one of the two networks has Tier-1 status.
Therefore, we do not endogenize the Intermediary's price of IP-Transit. See Pr ufer and Jahn
(2007) for a discussion of the inuence of Bertrand competition on the Internet backbone industry's
outlook and market structure.
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Figure 1: Network interconnection via an Intermediary
data.
 Technical marginal costs of sending data are zero.15
 Costs of connecting customers to a network within the battlezone are symmet-
ric and, for simplicity, normalized to zero.
 In case of a Peering arrangement, each network bears xed cost F > 0.16
Since top-level backbones do not charge dierent fees for upstream and downstream
trac, we assume that each consumer sends one unit of data to each other consumer
and receives one unit of data from each other consumer, thereby not taking into
account which network the other consumer is connected to (balanced calling pattern).
This yields every consumer a gross benet, v. Finally, we assume that prices pL
i in the
locked areas are not aected by competition in the battlezone, where both networks
charge every customer a price pi.
The timing of the game is as follows:
1. Networks A and B decide non-cooperatively about the interconnection regime
between them, Intermediary, Bill-and-Keep Peering or Paid Peering. Without
15Refer to the literature mentioned in footnote 5. We discuss this assumption in section 7.
16F encompasses all xed-step costs for setting up a physical interconnection, buying routers,
etc. and organizational costs for managing a Peering agreement.
7agreement both are forced to use the Intermediary. In case of Paid Peering,
networks bargain for a xed settlement which may ow in either direction.
2. Networks A and B set prices pi for consumers in the battlezone and compete
in a Hotelling-like environment.17
3. Consumers in the battlezone choose the network that maximizes their net
benets.
We begin by characterizing the equilibrium retail prots under Bill-and Keep Peering
(BK) and Intermediary. We then distinguish between BK and Paid Peering (PP).
Finally we compare the prots under the three regimes to reveal the incentives for
choosing one over the other.
4 Retail Competition Analysis
4.1 The Intermediary Regime
Consider a standard Hotelling (1929) model. Consumers are indexed by x and
uniformly distributed on the interval [0;1] with increasing preference for network B.
The network dierentiation parameter (transportation cost parameter) is  > 0, so
that a consumer's utility function is given by
U =
8
> > > <
> > > :
v   x   pA if buying from network A
v   (1   x)   pB if buying from network B
0 otherwise.
(1)
We assume that v is suciently large such that the market is covered. The marginal
consumer, who is indierent between A and B, is denoted by:
^ x =
1
2
+
pB   pA
2
: (2)
17Consumer heterogeneity could depend on dierent complementary services oered by the net-
works, e.g. specic Web content or software applications certain consumers are already used to.
Note that heterogeneity refers to the retail market of Internet access, while data exchange between
networks is a homogenous good.
8Note that ^ x also species A's market share within the battlezone, while (1 ^ x) is B's
battlezone market share. Prot functions under the Intermediary regime are given
by:18

I
A = ^ x (pA   2t) + A(p
L
A   2t)   2t(^ x  + A)((1   ^ x)  + B); (3)

I
B = (1   ^ x) (pB   2t) + B(p
L
B   2t)   2t(^ x  + A)((1   ^ x)  + B): (4)
The rst term of each function describes a network's direct prots from customers
in the battlezone net of Transit costs which stem from sending data to or receiving
data from customers of the other network. The second term denotes the same for
its locked customers, while the third term adjusts for the trac that is exchanged
between A and B. This term has to be paid to the Intermediary by each network, is
of equal size for both rms and becomes a driver of the main results of this model.
Note that trac has to be paid twice for each consumer since we have assumed that
all consumers both send data to and receive data from all other consumers.
Second-order-conditions are satised and the slopes of the reaction functions are
between zero and one for  > 2 t. We assume henceforth that this condition holds.
Equilibrium prices are given by:
p

A = (1   z) + 2t (5)
p

B = (1 + z) + 2t; (6)
where   A B  0 and z  2t
(3 4t ) > 0: Hence, A's equilibrium market share
is:
^ x =
1
2
+ z: (7)
Equation (7) implies that, to receive interior solutions for ^ x such that ^ x 2 [0;1],
it is necessary that   1
2z  max. If  > max, the larger network's low
pricing drives out the smaller network from the battlezone market. A and B would
consequently keep using the Intermediary for exchanging trac. Henceforth, we
restrict our analysis to  2 [0;max].
18We assume that networks are able to discriminate prices between locked consumers and the
battlezone. If that was not possible, as A  B, there would be no price Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies. Because of this and actual usage of price discrimination based on the sender's|not the
receiver's|location in the Internet, we restrict our analysis to this case.
9To facilitate further analysis, let us dene w as the amount of data A and B
exchange if they split the battlezone equally, i.e. if ^ x = 1
2:
w  2(A +
 
2
)(B +
 
2
): (8)
We can express equilibrium prots under the Intermediary regime as:

I
A =
1
2
  (1 + z   2z
2
2) + z
2
2 (3   2t )   tw + A(p
L
A   2t); (9)

I
B =
1
2
  (1   z   2z
2
2) + z
2
2 (3   2t )   tw + B(p
L
B   2t): (10)
It is obvious that A's direct prots from the battlezone, 1
2  (1 + z   2z22),
increase while B's direct prots decrease with growing asymmetry . Furthermore,
total Transit costs of each network, tw + i2t   z22 (3   2t ), are maximized
for symmetry ( = 0). We nd:
Lemma 1 Under the Intermediary regime, network A prices more aggressively, and
obtains a higher market share and larger prots in the battlezone than B.
The key to understanding this Lemma is that Transit payments of A and B to the
Intermediary decrease with growing network asymmetry. Thus, the larger network
A has a greater incentive to increase its market share than the smaller one: if
A sold to the marginal consumer, its income would increase and its Transit costs
would decrease. B faces an extra trade-o: when acquiring a marginal customer
within the battlezone, its income would increase, but the corresponding Transit
costs would increase as well. Therefore, A's marginal prot from acquiring another
customer is larger than B's, making A more aggressive. Similarly, A's ex post prots
increase with growing ex ante asymmetry, which also minimizes both networks'
Transit payments since more trac is exchanged "on-net", i.e., if sender and receiver
are customers of the same network.
4.2 Bill-and-Keep Peering
If networks peer with each other, their prot functions show two dierences in rela-
tion to the case without Peering: Peering's upside is that networks do not have to
10pay the Intermediary for trac that is exchanged solely between the two networks
involved. Its downside is that the Peering partners have to set up direct lines, buy
new equipment such as routers and have to bear Peering management costs. All
these types of costs are compiled in the variable F, which is not, according to var-
ious industry talks, correlated with either the network size or the amount of trac
transmitted.
This leads to the following prot functions under Peering:

P
A = ^ x (pA   2t) + A(p
L
A   2t)   F; (11)

P
B = (1   ^ x) (pB   2t) + B(p
L
B   2t)   F: (12)
Equilibrium prices, market shares, and prots can be characterized as:
p

A =  + 2t = p

B (13)
^ x =
1
2
(14)

P
A =
1
2
   + A(p
L
A   2t)   F (15)

P
B =
1
2
   + B(p
L
B   2t)   F (16)
Lemma 2 Under the Peering regime of interconnection, (i) regardless of asymme-
tries in installed bases, networks' pricing behavior is symmetric. (ii) Market shares
in the battlezone are symmetric. (iii) Ignoring prots from the installed bases, prof-
its from competition in the battlezone are symmetric. (iv) If installed bases were
symmetric ( = 0), equilibrium prices and battlezone market shares would be the
same under Intermediary and Peering regimes.
The intuition for (i) through (iii) is that, since under a Peering regime Transit
costs for trac between the two parties are waived, the larger network has no extra
incentive to undercut the smaller one. Therefore, incentive structures, behavior and
prots are symmetric. This intuition is conrmed by (iv) stating that symmetric
networks always behave in the same way regardless of the interconnection regime.
115 Equilibrium Interconnection Regimes
5.1 Comparing Transit and Peering
Being aware of Nash equilibria in retail prices, we proceed to analyze incentives
in the rst stage of the game: When do networks wish to peer with a specic
competitor? What form of Peering would prevail? We will rst distinguish between
Intermediary and Peering equilibria|equating\Peering"with its most exible form,
Paid Peering|and then distinguish Bill-and-Keep from Paid Peering outcomes.
To facilitate further analysis, let us dene I as networks' aggregate prots under
Intermediary:

I  
I
A + 
I
B =   (1   2z
2
2) + 2z
2
2 (3   2t )
  2tw + A(p
L
A   2t) + B(p
L
B   2t): (17)
If we assume that, in line with agreeing to Paid Peering, networks bargain about
a lump-sum settlement-fee before they enter retail competition, then this fee will
have no allocative, only distributive eects. Hence, aggregate prots from BK will
equal aggregate prots from PP and we can dene both as:

P  
P
A + 
P
B =    + A(p
L
A   2t) + B(p
L
B   2t)   2F: (18)
Aggregate Intermediary prots are larger than aggregate Peering prots if:

I   
P = 2F   2tw + 4 z
2
2(    t) > 0: (19)
Dene P as the threshold level, where I = P and above which I > P. We
have to resubstitute w, as it depends on A and B, in (19), which yields after
rearranging:19
P 
p
(4 t   3)2( 2F + (   1)2t)
p
t( 8 t + 9)
: (20)
Lemma 3 (i) Intermediary constitutes a Nash equilibrium for any level of . (ii)
For  > P, Intermediary constitutes the unique Nash equilibrium. (iii) For  
P, Paid Peering constitutes a Nash equilibrium.
19See Equation (A.3) and its explanations in Appendix A.2 for more information.
12Proof: refer to the appendix.
Figure 2: LEFT: Contour plot of constant (I  P) - levels; lighter-colored regions
refer to higher levels; RIGHT: P - curve.
Part (i) of the Lemma depends on our assumption that it is only possible to
deviate from the Intermediary strategy jointly. If only one network chooses the
Intermediary strategy in the rst stage, the other is forced to pay Transit fees too.20
Figure 2 supports the intuition of Lemma 3, parts (ii) and (iii).21 The LEFT panel
shows that (I   P) is increasing both in  and in F, which is intuitive: if F,
the xed cost of the Peering regimes, grows larger, Peering gets less attractive as
compared to Intermediary. Similarly, as explained below Lemma 1, if the asymmetry
between networks A and B increases, i.e. if  grows, the total cost to be paid to the
Intermediary decreases and the Intermediary regime becomes more attractive. The
RIGHT panel depicts the one curve of the left panel where (I   P) = 0, i.e., it
shows P. Above this curve, the Intermediary regime is more attractive than any
Peering regime|and, consequently, a unique Nash equilibrium. Below this curve,
20This implies that we could use a stronger equilibrium concept, equilibrium in weakly dominant
strategies, to rule out (Intermediary, Intermediary) as an equilibrium strategy for all  < P. For
the sake of consistency with stage 2 of the game, however, we stay with (subgame-perfect) Nash
equilibrium as our solution concept.
21For details of the numerical example used see appendix A.2.
13Peering is more attractive than Intermediary given that excess prots can be split
between A and B via side-payments without frictions, which we assume in the Paid
Peering regime.
Note that, to yield the results presented here, it is not necessary to specify the
Paid Peering settlement-fee. It is only helpful to assume that this fee|or access
charge| unlike in most papers on interconnection in telecommunications, is of a
lump-sum type, not a per unit of data fee.22 Given this we can expect that individual
prots from the Intermediary case serve as threat points in the bargaining process
while only\excess"prots (P   I) are shared according to some bargaining rule.
5.2 Comparing Bill-and-Keep with Paid Peering
Assume   P. We showed that Paid Peering constitutes a Nash equilibrium in
this range. What about Bill-and-Keep? It facilitates further analysis if we rst char-
acterize the networks' relative individual incentives to accept Bill-and-Keep Peering.
Lemma 4 The smaller network has stronger incentives to reach a Peering agree-
ment relative to using the Intermediary than the larger network, i.e., P
A   I
A <
P
B   I
B 8  > 0.
Proof: See the appendix.
Consequently, in any Paid Peering regime network B pays a settlement-fee to
network A, not vice versa.23
If   P, we necessarily have P
B   I
B > 0. Therefore, when comparing BK
and Intermediary, in this range the smaller network always agrees to BK. Since,
by denition, no side-payments can be exchanged under the BK regime, BK will
constitute a Nash equilibrium i P
A   I
A  0, too.
Dene BK as the threshold level, where P
A = I
A and below which P
A > I
A.
By using (15) and (10) and rearranging we get:
22See section 7 and appendix A.7 for a comparative analysis of the per-unit case. Our assumption
relates to Besen et al. (2001), whose approach is based on the Nash bargaining model of Binmore
et al. (1986).
23It is noteworthy that we obtain this nding even without assuming network externalities in the
utility functions of consumers. If we assumed such externalities, consumers would ex ante prefer
the larger network A over the smaller network B, which would increase A's bargaining power and
the settlement-fee paid from B to A even more.
14BK 
( z +
p
 2z22   4(2F   (   1)2t)(t   4 2tz2 + 4 z2))
t(8 2z2   2)   8 z2
: (21)
Lemma 5 (i) BK < P. (ii) For   BK, Bill-and-Keep constitutes a Nash
equilibrium.
Proof: Refer to the appendix.
Lemma 5.(ii) expresses that, if two networks are suciently symmetric, each one
gains individually by switching from Intermediary to BK, even without a lump-sum
being paid by the other one. However, there is an upper bound, BK, for the range
where this occurs in equilibrium. Lemma 5.(i) states that, as long as networks are
asymmetric in size, this upper bound is strictly below the upper bound of Paid
Peering, P. Hence, there exists an intermediate -range, where BK <   P.
In this range, a subsidy is required in order for network A to be willing to peer. But
since P
B  I
B, network B is willing to pay it via a Paid Peering settlement-fee; and
since P  I, there is sucient surplus to compensate network A.
Based on Lemmas 3 and 5, we summarize our key insights in:
Proposition 1 (i) For  2 [0;BK], Intermediary, Bill-and-Keep, and Paid Peer-
ing constitute Nash equilibria. (b) For  2 (BK;P], Intermediary and Paid
Peering constitute Nash equilibria. (iii) For  2 (P;max], Intermediary consti-
tutes a unique Nash equilibrium.
Figure 3 illustrates Proposition 1:24 It plots P and BK and shows, where all
three regimes (region X), Intermediary and Paid Peering (region Y), and uniquely
Intermediary (region Z) constitute Nash equilibria.
As we explained below Lemma 3, Intermediary is a Nash equilibrium for all levels
of asymmetry. This might explain why we observe usage of IP-Transit among both
symmetric and asymmetric networks in practice. Below P, however, at least one
Peering regime is preferred by the networks over buying IP-Transit. Moreover, here
they can deviate from playing an Intermediary strategy without risk because the
fallback outcome, if the other network does not pick the same Peering strategy, is
24For details of the numerical example used see appendix A.2.
15Figure 3: Network interconnection in equilibrium
Intermediary. This suggests an intuition why, according to anecdotal evidence, Bill-
and-Keep Peering has been the dominant Peering regime in practice. If networks
are suciently symmetric (region X) and the smaller network can credibly announce
that it will not bargain over a settlement-fee (which is not captured by our model),
the larger network is better o by accepting BK instead of paying the Intermediary.25
If networks' asymmetry is intermediate (region Y), the smaller network knows that
the larger would never accept BK because, as an outside option, Intermediary is
more attractive. Then, the smaller network is better o paying some of its gains
from Peering via a settlement-fee thereby compensating the larger one for its losses.
Reecting on these two arguments indicates that in practice|and outside of our
model|the sequence of moves is crucial.
25One reason for the smaller network's resistance to bargain at all in practice could be explained
by the fact that the bargaining process associated with Paid Peering may involve extra transaction
costs in comparison to BK. Another explanation could be legacy which is, however, questionable
from a purely rational point of view. The argument claims that, at the beginning of the commercial
Internet era, networks did not focus on the strategic aspects of interconnection but strived for
reaching world-wide connectivity fast. Nowadays, they found themselves in the resource consuming
process of reviewing their existing Peering policies.
166 Welfare
6.1 Consumer Surplus
We restrict the analysis to the   consumers residing in the battlezone since consumer
surplus within the locked regions is neither a function of the networks' interconnec-
tion regime nor of their battlezone prices. Hence aggregate consumer surplus is the
integral over individual net benet, equation (1). As under (Paid) Peering, equilib-
rium prices of networks A and B are equal and each one gets a market share of 0.5,
we can calculate consumer surplus as:
CS
P = 2 
Z 0:5
0
(v   x   pA)dx =  (v  
5
4
   2t): (22)
In contrast, consumer surplus under Intermediary is denoted by:
CS
I =  
Z ^ x
0
(v   x   pA)dx +
Z 1
^ x
(v   (1   x)   pB)dx

=  (v  
5
4
   2t) +  z
2
2 = CS
P +  z
2
2: (23)
Analogously to Lemma 2.(iv), we have CSP = CSI if networks are symmetric
( = 0). But for all  > 0 consumer surplus is larger under the Intermediary
regime. This is intuitive since under Intermediary the larger network competes
more aggressively in prices than under Peering and it also obtains a higher market
share within the battlezone. Hence a majority of consumers enjoy extra surplus
which is not oset completely by higher prices that are paid by the fewer customers
of the smaller network. It is straightforward to observe from (23) that consumer
surplus under Intermediary relative to Peering increases even further with growing
network asymmetry.
6.2 Total Welfare
What is the maximum level of asymmetry up to which networks should peer from
a social perspective? We dene the threshold level Soc
P , at which a social planner
who includes both consumer surplus and producer surplus (prots of networks A
17and B and the Intermediary network) in his objective function is indierent between
Peering and Intermediary. It satises the following:
CS
P + 
P + 
P
Int = CS
I + 
I + 
I
Int; (24)
where prots of the Intermediary network are denoted by P
Int = 2t(A + B +  )
when A and B peer and by I
Int = P
Int + 2tuw   2z22 (3   2t ) when A and B
do not peer. Employing these equations and (22), (18), (23), and (17) yields that
from a social planner's perspective networks should peer i:
 
(3   4 t)
p
F
t
p
2 
 
Soc
P : (25)
However, since currently all major Intermediary backbones are U.S. based rms,26
we are also interested in the ranges of asymmetry where a non-U.S. policy maker
would like networks to peer, i.e. without taking into account the prots of the
Intermediary network. Therefore, we set:
CS
P + 
P = CS
I + 
I (26)
and nd that in this\trade policy"case a regulator would want networks to peer as
long as the following holds:
 
p
(4 t   3)2( 2F + (   1)2t)
p
t(9   4 t)
 
TP
P : (27)
These insights establish the following:
Proposition 2 (i) A social planner prefers Peering among relatively asymmetric
networks (for   Soc
P ). (ii) \Trade policy" regulators prefer Peering among
relatively symmetric networks (for   TP
P ). (iii) Networks peer excessively:
P > TP
P .
Proof: See the appendix.
It might be startling that both a trade policy regulator and the prot maximizing
networks prefer Peering for a lesser degree of asymmetry, while a social planner
26See http://www.xedorbit.com/stats.htm.
18prefers Peering for larger asymmetry. To understand the intuition of Proposition 2,
parts (i) and (ii), recall that the respective optimizers include dierent parameters
in their calculi.
Networks trade-o Peering costs F versus Transit costs depending on t. If 
increases, F remains constant whilst joint Transit costs decrease. Therefore, above
a certain level of asymmetry, P, networks prefer the Intermediary regime.
A\trade policy" regulator faces the same trade-o and hence prefers Peering for
low levels of asymmetry. But in addition he takes into account consumer surplus,
which grows with  under Intermediary due to ercer network competition but
remains constant under Peering. Therefore, trade policy makers wish to have the
Intermediary regime implemented for lower levels of asymmetry than the networks
themselves.
A social planner, in contrast, does not observe the eect of decreasing Transit
costs for larger asymmetry as this money ows to the Intermediary backbone, which
is included in his optimization calculus. Therefore, for low levels of asymmetry he
only considers Peering costs F|and prefers Intermediary regimes. With rising ,
under Intermediary the social planner observes distortions due to networks' ercer
competition, which depend on the transportation cost  in the model. As a conse-
quence, above a threshold, Soc
P , he prefers interconnection via Peering regimes.
When comparing P, Soc
P , and TP
P , the only general statement we can make
is Proposition 2.(iii). Only if A and B are completely symmetric ( = 0), networks
peer when a\trade policy"regulator wants them to peer. In all other circumstances,
they peer excessively from this perspective.
Figure 4 displays the three -thresholds using the same numerical example as
before (see Appendix A.2). A social planner prefers Peering to the right of Soc
P
(region X), while a\trade policy"regulator prefers Peering to the left of TP
P (region
Y). Networks peer to the left of P (regions Y and Z). Notice that unlike in previous
gures we plotted the curves on the entire support of  (which is [0;0:4] in our
numerical example). In equilibrium, however, battlezone competition does not exist
to the right of max. Hence, there networks always use the Intermediary to exchange
trac.
We plotted the full support of  to show that Soc
P can intersect with P and
TP
P (depending on parameter values, the intersection can lie to the left of max).
19Figure 4: Networks' equilibrium behavior vs. social planner's and trade policy
regulator's perspectives.
Therefore, we can make no general statement on the relative positions of the curves.
However, we can show that the following holds:
Proposition 3 If  < 1 and  = 0, F(Soc
P ) < F(TP
P ) = F(P).
Proof: See the appendix.
Proposition 3 implies that, given that there exists a battlezone or at least one
network has a positive installed base (notably the starting point of this paper), Soc
P
serves as an upper bound with respect to F and as a lower bound with respect to 
for a region, in which both the social planner and the trade policy regulator agree
with networks' Peering decisions. For other (;F)-combinations, the regulatory
bodies would like to intervene|not necessarily in the same direction.
7 Discussion
Paid Peering using a per-unit access charge: Hitherto we assumed the transfer
payment or access charge between networks to be a lump-sum, not a per-unit of
20data fee (henceforth: variable fee). The two are structurally similar as long as the
variable fee does not inuence pricing behavior in the retail market. Given this, the
lump-sum could be interpreted as the sum of all per-unit fees in a given period. In
contrast, a variable fee does indeed have an inuence on the networks' retail pricing:
they tacitly collude even more than under lump-sum Paid Peering by splitting the
battlezone 50:50 and symmetrically increasing retail prices. Thus, some consumer
surplus is shifted to the networks. Qualitatively our results, namely Propositions
1 to 3, remain unchanged, though. For a more detailed analysis of variable Paid
Peering refer to appendix A.7.
Positive marginal costs of sending data: In our analysis, building on es-
tablished institutional literature and interviews with industry representatives, we
assumed the marginal costs of sending data to be zero.27 If those costs were posi-
tive, they would inuence retail prices as a mark-up in all interconnection regimes
symmetrically28 as long as there would be no dierences in costs for sending on-net
or o-net trac, which there is no technical reason for. Atkinson and Barnekov
(2004, p.3) support our view by pointing out that the operating costs of a telecom-
munications network can be estimated well by the number of end-users connected
to that network. They reject the idea that trac volume is a major determinant for
networks' operating costs.
Non-covered market: Let si be the market share of network i in the battlezone.
If we lift our restriction, that the market be covered, we have sA+sB  1: Under the
Intermediary regime, the costs that a marginal consumer residing in the battlezone
creates when buying from network A by exchanging data with consumers connected
to network B are (B +  sB)2t. If he buys from network B, these marginal costs are
(A +  sA)2t. Assuming that both networks start with an equal battlezone market
share, say sA = sB = 0, and using A > B, it is obvious that the marginal costs
of connecting an additional consumer are lower for network A than for network B.
Because of the uniform distribution of consumers along the [0;1]-interval, marginal
revenues are equal for both networks. Consequently, network A's marginal prot
for connecting another consumer in the battlezone is larger than B's. This makes
A more aggressive and leads to pA < pB, just as in Lemma 1. Under the Peering
27Refer to the literature mentioned in footnote 5.
28This is a standard eect in Hotelling models.
21regime, when assuming equal battlezone market shares sA = sB as a starting point,
ceteris paribus the marginal incentives to attract another consumer are equal for
both networks, just as in Lemma 2. Depending on the shape of the demand curve,
it is possible, however, that elastic demand has an eect on our welfare conclusions,
Propositions 2 and 3.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we have suggested a model of the Internet backbone market, which
explicitly takes into account dierences in the size of networks. We have analyzed
the consequences of those asymmetries for the optimal interconnection decisions
of IBPs, which are strategically linked to retail competition for end-users. In line
with that, we have studied the role of unregulated access charges as a means of
tacit collusion when networks choose a Paid Peering regime. The main practical
implications of our model both for networks, consumers, and policy makers inside
and outside the U.S. are the following:
1. If, besides Intermediary and Bill-and-Keep, networks also consider Paid Peer-
ing as a possible type of interconnection, we expect to observe more Paid
Peering in the future. This would translate to more Peering agreements in
general which, in turn, would lead to higher prots of IBPs.
2. This development would harm consumer surplus.
3. Since the emergence of Paid Peering also lowers demand for IP-Transit, top
level backbones can be expected to lose revenues.
4. As all top level backbones are U.S.-based, non-U.S. policy makers do not in-
clude prots from IP-Transit in their calculus. Instead of considering punishing
large networks who refuse (Bill-and-Keep) Peering to smaller ones, these pol-
icy makers should consider restricting Peering because networks do not care
about the fact that ercer competition under Intermediary benets consumers,
and peer excessively instead. In contrast, since U.S.-based policy makers do
account for prots from IP-Transit, they should favor Peering among networks
suciently asymmetric in size. Hence, they should seek to discourage large
networks from refusing to peer with smaller ones.
22These implications could also be applied to a telecommunications market which
was both unregulated in terms of inter-carrier compensation fees and not subject to
price discrimination regarding the destinations of calls.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 3
(i): This follows from our assumption that the agreement of both networks is needed
to deviate from the Intermediary regime.
(ii):  > P , P < I. There average Peering prots are smaller than average
Intermediary prots. Hence, at least one network has an incentive to deviate from a
Peering strategy and switch to Intermediary. The other network cannot gain enough
prots from the Peering regime to oer a side-payment (via a settlement-fee) that
induces the deviating network not to deviate. Formally:

PP
i > 
I
i but 
PP
j < 
I
j 8 i;j 2 fA;Bg: (A.1)
(iii):   P , P  I. There exists a settlement-fee S 2 N that makes both
networks better o under Paid Peering than under Intermediary such that:

PP
i = 
P
i + S  
I
i and 
PP
j = 
P
i   S  
I
j 8 i;j 2 fA;Bg:  (A.2)
A.2 Numerical example
Using A =  + B and B = 1      A     yields:
w = 2(
 
2
+
1          
2
)(
 
2
+  +
1          
2
): (A.3)
Hence, any increase in  reects an increase in A and a decrease in B.
In the numerical example of Figure 2 we used  = 0:4,   = 0:2. Hence A +
B = 0:4 ) A 2 [0:2;0:4] )  2 [0;0:4]. Furthermore, we used t = 1 and
 = 0:5 > 2 t = 0:4, by assumption. z = 2t
3 4 t = 2:857. Substituting these values
23we get:

I   
P = 2F   0:36 + 2:959
2 (A.4)
The LEFT panel of Figure 2 displays curves of constant I   P - levels while the
RIGHT panel picks the one curve where I   P = 0. Both panels only cover
 2 [0;0:175] because max = 1
2z = 0:175.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 4
Network A's incentives to BK are smaller than B's, if P
A   I
A < P
B   I
B, or:
1
2
   + A(p
L
A   2t)   F  
1
2
  (1 + z   2z
2
2)   z
2
2 (3   2t ) + tw   A(p
L
A   2t)
<
1
2
   + B(p
L
B   2t)   F  
1
2
  (1   z   2z
2
2)   z
2
2 (3   2t ) + tw   B(p
L
B   2t);
which can be rearranged as:
 F  
1
2
  (z   2z
2
2)   z
2
2 (3   2t ) + tw
<  F  
1
2
  ( z   2z
2
2)   z
2
2 (3   2t ) + tw;
and reduces further to:
 
1
2
  z <  
1
2
  ( z);
  z > 0:
This is true as long as  > 0 because ;  ;z > 0, by denition. 
A.4 Proof of Lemma 5
(i): For  = BK, by denition we have:

P
A = 
I
A; (A.5)
24and, by Lemma 4 and assuming  > 0, there we have:

P
B > 
I
B: (A.6)
We shall distinguish among three cases:
1. Assume BK = P. Then, P requires P
A + P
B = I
A + I
B. Substituting
(A.5) in this condition yields P
B = I
B, which is in contradiction to (A.6).
2. Assume BK > P. Then, P requires P
A + P
B < I
A + I
B. Substituting
(A.5) in this condition yields P
B < I
B, which is in contradiction to (A.6).
3. Assume BK < P. Then, P requires P
A + P
B > I
A + I
B. Substituting
(A.5) in this condition yields P
B > I
B, which is in line with (A.6).
(ii): If one network plays BK and the other does not, they end up using the Inter-
mediary. If   BK, by denition, P
i  I
i 8 i. Hence, there is no incentive
to deviate from playing BK. Therefore, for  2 [0;BK] both BK and PP are
equilibria, while for  2 (BK;P] only PP is a Peering equilibrium. 
A.5 Proof of Proposition 2
(i): This follows from equation (25).
(ii): This follows from equation (27).
(iii): Assume: P > TP
P . This equals:
p
(4 t   3)2( 2F + (   1)2t)
p
t( 8 t + 9)
>
p
(4 t   3)2( 2F + (   1)2t)
p
t( 4 t + 9)
: (A.7)
Both numerators are equal. If F <
( 1)2t
2 , the numerators are positive and (A.7)
equals:
1
p
9   8 t
>
1
p
9   4 t
: (A.8)
25Due to our assumptions, namely  > 2 t, both expressions are positive. The LHS's
denominator is smaller than the RHS's. Consequently:
P > 
TP
P 8 F <
(   1)2t
2
: (A.9)
For the supremum, F =
( 1)2t
2 , we have P = TP
P = 0. Hence, if  > 0,
F(P);F(TP
P ) <
( 1)2t
2 and we have:29
P > 
TP
P 8  > 0:  (A.10)
A.6 Proof of Proposition 3
We have proven F(Pj = 0) = F(TP
P j = 0) in Proof of Proposition 2.(iii).
F(TP
P ) > F(Soc
P ) equals:
t
2
(1 + (   2) +
2(4 t   9)
(4 t   3)2 ) >
2 2t2
(4 t   3)2: (A.11)
For  = 0, this reduces to:
t
2
(1 + (   2) > 0; (A.12)
which is true 8  < 1: 
A.7 Analysis of Per-Unit Access Fees/Variable Paid Peering
Assume that a is a fee that network B has to pay network A for every unit of
data exchanged between the two networks under a Paid Peering regime. Because of
Lemma 4, a > 0 8  > 0. Prot functions in the retail market change to:

vPP
A = ^ x (pA   2t) + A(p
L
A   2t) + 2a(^ x  + A)((1   ^ x)  + B)   F

vPP
B = (1   ^ x) (pB   2t) + B(p
L
B   2t)   2a(^ x  + A)((1   ^ x)  + B)   F:
29This can be seen|for the numerical example|in Figure 4.
26Equilibrium prices are derived as pvPP
A =  + 2t + 2a = pvPP
B , leading to an
equilibrium market share for A (and for B, respectively) of ^ x = 1
2. Consequently,
equilibrium retail prots under variable Paid Peering are denoted by:

vPP
A =
1
2
 ( + 2a) + A(p
L
A   2t) + aw   F

vPP
B =
1
2
 ( + 2a) + B(p
L
B   2t)   aw   F:
Because of pvPP
i = pP
i + 2a, we have vPP
A + vPP
B > P. Hence, variable Paid
Peering is sustainable for the networks for even larger asymmetries and we nd:

vPP
P > P 8  > 0: (A.13)
However, since the other rm-level results remain unchanged, Proposition 1 does
not change. Due to the fact that, under variable Paid Peering, the reduction of
consumer surplus is completely redistributed to networks, SOC
P and TP
P are not
altered, too. Consequently, Propositions 2 and 3 hold.
Interpretation: Using a variable Paid Peering fee lets networks not only tacitly
collude in the battlezone (and share that market 50 : 50) but it lets them increase
prices even more than under lump-sum Paid Peering. A variable access charge is
used to increase the other network's perceived marginal cost (even if the access
charge is received, not paid!).30 Consequently, joint prots are larger and consumer
surplus is smaller when a variable fee is used.
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